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This  paper  applies  previous  theoretical  and  empirical  results  on  in- 
flation and demand for money  to  a  study  of  inflationary finance and 
the welfare  cost  of  inflation. The  amount of  revenue generated by  a 
steady inflation is derived as a function of  the inflation rate and some 
underlying parameters. Empirically, the revenue-maximizing rate is  on 
the  order of  140 percent per  month with  the  corresponding revenue 
approximating 15 percent of  national income. It  is  argued that hyper- 
inflations become  unstable  when  the  revenue-maximizing rate  is  ex- 
ceeded.  Because  inflation leads  to  higher  transaction costs  (resulting 
from  greater payment  frequencies and reduced use  of  "money" as  a 
payments medium),  there is  a net  social  cost  attached to  inflationary 
finance. The model implies that marginal collection costs of inflationary 
finance exceed 50 percent for all positive  rates of  inflation-hence,  al- 
ternative means of  raising revenue should be  socially  preferable. The 
analysis also provides estimates of  the social gain from moving to  the 
optimum quantity of money as 1-3 percent of income. 
In  a previous  paper  (Barro  1970b)  I  analyzed  the  impact  of  inflation  on 
the  demand  for  money.  That  paper  developed  a  theoretical  model  which 
centered  on  the  frequency  of  payments  and  the  fraction  of  monetized 
transactions.  The  theory  was  applied  to  a  study  of  demand  for  money 
during  several  hyperinflations.  Section  I  of  the  current  paper  contains  a 
brief  summary  of  the  earlier  results.  The  remainder  of  the  paper  describes 
some  theoretical  and  empirical  extensions  of  these  results. 
In  Section  II  monetary  expansion  is  viewed  as  a  vehicle  for  generating 
government  revenue,  and  the  earlier  theory  and  empirical  findings  are 
utilized  to  relate  the  volume  of  inflationary  finance  to  the  (steady)  mone- 
National  Science  Foundation  grant  GS-3246  supported  this  research. I  am  grateful 
to  Ed  Feige,  whose  comments  on  a  seemingly  unrelated  topic  caused  me  to  revise 
Section III  of this paper. 
978 WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  979 
tary growth rate. The  rate which maximizes steady-state revenue is  also 
derived. Extreme rates from observed hyperinflations are compared with 
the revenue-maximizing  rates in the context of stability of hyperinflation. 
It is argued that hyperinflations  tend to become unstable (from the money- 
supply side) when the revenue-maximizing  rate is exceeded. 
Section III  considers the welfare cost or excess burden of  anticipated 
inflation. The cost of inflation to individuals exceeds the volume of infla- 
tionary finance because increased inflation leads to  increased transaction 
costs. In this model the increased transaction costs take two forms; first, 
an increased frequency of  transactions (higher velocity)  for those trans- 
actions which use money, and, second, an increase in  the proportion of 
transactions  which employ an alternative, but socially less efficient, medium 
of  exchange. The analysis provides quantitative measures of  welfare cost 
and marginal collection cost  (welfare cost relative to revenue generation) 
as a function of the inflation rate. The results also provide an estimate of 
the potential social gain from achieving the optimum quantity of money. 
Section IV contains some additional empirical results on hyperinflations. 
This section includes a comparison of  the hyperinflationary experience in 
post-World War II Hungary with the post-World War I experience in the 
same country, and a test for the absence of money illusion in the demand 
for money during hyperinflations. 
I.  Summary  of  Previous  Results 
In  the  earlier  model  a  real-income  stream  Y/P  is  associated  with  an 
endogenous payment interval, Tln,  where n  is  the number of  payments 
that  occur over a  time interval T.  It  is  assumed that  the  real cost  of 
making (wage) payments is solely a lump-sum amount a/P.  Prices change 
at the constant (proportionate) rate rp. The real rate at which increases 
in the payments period are discounted is r*. In the case of deferred wage 
payment,  a  lengthening of  the  pay  period  implies  an  increase in  the 
average loan  outstanding from  employees to  employers  (Barro  1970b, 
p. 1235). The appropriate  discount rate for the payments period is there- 
fore the difference  between the rates imputed by employees and employers, 
r*-  rh -  rf, where rh is the employee (household) rate and rf is the em- 
ployer (firm) rate. In the earlier analysis rf was assumed to be  (approx- 
imately)  zero; hence r* was equal to rh. 
If all payments corresponding  to the income stream Y/P  are monetized, 
the cost per time (to employers and employees) associated with the period 
Tln  can be approximated  by' 
1 Equation  (1)  assumes that  employers  receive income  and  employees  spend  income 
at  a uniform  rate,  and  that  no  satisfactory  intermediate  assets  are  available-that  is, 
both  units  hold  money  until  either  a  wage  payment  or  a  purchase  of  commodities 980  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
a  n  Y  T  a  n 
Z :  (r. +  r*) (MIP)  +  --:  (rp +  r*) -  -  +-  -  ( 1) 
P  T  P  n  P  T 
The first term in the cost expression corresponds to  the interest cost on 
average  (employer  plus  employee)  money  balances:  (M/P)  (Y/P) 
(T/n).  The second term describes the cost of making payments at the rate 
n/T.  The cost-minimizing payments period is 
T/n  aiJ  (2) 
iYI/P(rp  +  r*) 
As inflation intensifies, the optimal pay  period declines in equation  (2), 
thus signifying a direct increase in velocity and a corresponding  reduction 
in real money holding. 
Denoting  the  endogenously determined fraction of  transactions which 
employ money by  (1 -  (),  the  average holding of  money is  given by 
(using eq.  [ 2  ] ) 
M  Y  T  (1  D)A (Y/IP) 
-  - 
(I 
-  ~D)  _____  (3) 
P  P  n  Vrp  +  r* 
where  A  -  N7(a/P)/(Y/P)  is  assumed  to  be  constant  (since  a/P  is  re- 
garded as  primarily an  income-foregone cost).  In  equation  (3 ),  if  the 
monetization fraction, (1 -  SF), is  fixed the elasticity of money demand 
with respect to  the inflation rate approaches -1/2  as rp becomes large 
relative to r*. For moderate rates of  (positive)  inflation, the  (absolute) 
elasticity is below one-half. 
From the previous analysis, the determination of (D  involves a weighing 
of  the inflationary cost attached to  the continued use of  money against 
some loss of  convenience (increased transaction costs)  associated with a 
switch  to  an  alternative,  relatively  stable-valued  transactions medium 
(such as barter). Under a particular assumption concerning the distribu- 
tion over types of  transactions of  the benefit of  money usage  (a  gamma 
distribution),  the  fraction of  monetized expenditures can  be  written as 
an explicit function of the inflation rate:2 
occurs. The  formula  also  involves  a  minor  approximation  of  the  form  (r.  +  r*) T/n 
<  1. 
2 The  earlier  paper  contains  some  errors  in  the  derivation  of  P  (Barro  1970b, 
p.  1241).  If,  for  the  ith  group  of  transactions,  (i  denotes  the  percentage  of  non- 
monetized  transactions,  (Y/P)i  denotes  the  total  volume  of  transactions,  and  (V/P)i 
measures the transactions benefit of employing  money  instead  of  the substitute  medium 
per  amount  of  monetized  transaction  (where  the  groupings  over  i  are  determined  so 
that  [V/P]l  is constant),  then  eq.  (30)  in  the previous  paper indicated  that  IJi should 
be chosen to maximize Ri =  (1 - AI)  (Y/P)i(V/P)i  -  2A (1 -  i) (Y/P)y(x/rp  +r* 
VA~). The  correct criterion is  to  maximize  Ri  -  (1 - "i+)  (Y/P)  i  (V/P)i  -  2A(Y/P) 
0(1  -1i)  (rp + r*)  +  /I(r*)  1.  However,  the  two  criteria  lead  to  the  identical 
corner solution for choosing (Di, namely, 4Ji =  1 if  (W/P)i  <  2A  (a/777r  - WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  98I 
(1  ()  [1  +  k (  -  r  ) 
.expr  k(Vrp+r*-Vr*)],  (4) 
(r?  0) 
(1-  1)  1  (ra?O) 
where "exp" indicates exponentiation from base e.  In  equation  (4)  the 
fraction of monetized transactions is inversely related to the inflation rate, 
with the magnitude of  the  (negative)  response determined by  the  non- 
negative parameter  k. In the theoretical model the k parameter  is inversely 
related to  the  average cost  per  amount of  transaction of  employing a 
money-substitute transactions medium. 
Combining equations (3)  and (4)  yields a demand-for-money  function 
in which the inflation-rate elasticity can be approximated  as 
1/  rp  k2  rp 
'qrp ;:~  -  -+  (5) 
2  rp +  r*  1 +  k  V/rp 
For moderate values of rp (rp  r*),  the term involving k is  empirically 
negligible and qrp can be approximated  by the first term on the right side 
of equation (5).  For very high values of rp, the second term, which derives 
from the substitution of an alternative transactions medium, becomes im- 
portant. Since k >  0,  the inflation-rate elasticity  eventually rises  (abso- 
lutely)  above one-half. The  rate of  increase in  the  absolute elasticity is 
positively related to k and, therefore, inversely related to the average cost 
of employing the alternative payments medium. 
The model described  above was extended to situations where the inflation 
rate varied over  time  through the  development of  an  effective  rate-of- 
inflation (nEc)  mechanism. Essentially, a distributed-lag mechanism involv- 
ing a variable coefficient of adjustment was derived. The  discrete form of 
the distributed-lag model is  (when r* <  se) 
\/te  =(t-\/jt  +  (  t)  et1 
(6) 
Pt  -  exp  1b(t  )](b  >  0), 
4  -  0  otherwise. Therefore, no substantive  change from the previous  result is required. 
The solution  for  (1 -  1)  indicated in eq.  (4)  follows  from the assumption that  (W/P)1 
is  distributed,  independently  of  (Y/P)i,  according  to  a second-order  gamma  distribu- 
tion.  The  formula in  eq.  (3),  M/P=  (1-  4D)(Y/P)  (T/n),  and  not  M/P=V/1-  I 
(Y/P)  (T/n),  is correct if  (1 -  1)  is interpreted as the  fraction  of  economic  units  (as 
well  as  the  fraction  of  transactions)  which  employ  money.  I  am  grateful  to  Gary 
Gillum for pointing  out  the errors in  the  previous  analysis. 982  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where jEt  is the actual (average)  rate of inflation between t -  1 and t,  a 
bar indicates an average of t and t -1  values, and b is an unknown co- 
efficient, with (adt/ab)  >  0,  (O0t/1te)  >  0, and 0 <  t  1. 
Given a value for b and a time series for n  (and a starting point for 
a'),  equation (6)  determines a time series for Jne. The ne  variable is then 
incorporated  into the money-demand model of  equations (3)  and  (4): 
log (MIP)  _  al  +  a2  log (Se  +  r*) +  log (1 -  ) ; 
(1 -1  )  [ 1 +  +  k(Ie+r*  -Vr*)] 
* exp  [-k(Ve  +  r*  Vr*  )],  (7) 
where the  theory suggests:  a2  _12,  k>  0. 
Making the approximations:  Se  >  >  r*  0 and a1  log  (A  *  Y/P) 
constant, the  four parameters (al,  a2,  k,  b)  of  equations (6)  and  (7) 
were previously estimated  for  four cases  of  post-World  War  I  hyper- 
inflation-Austria,  Germany, Hungary (Hungary I),  and Poland  (Barro 
1970b, p.  1255).  Results for post-World War II  Hungary (Hungary II) 
have  now  been  obtained in  the  same  framework and  are  included  in 
table 4. These results will be discussed in detail in Section IV. Since the 
underlying  theory  suggests  a2  =  12,  and  since  this  conjecture  was 
borne out  by  the  empirical results for  the  five  cases of  hyperinflation, 
estimates of  (a,,  k, b)  have also been obtained subject to the constraint: 
a2 =  -  These estimates are included in table 3  and are used in  the 
discussion of  Sections II  and III. 
II.  Inflationary  Finance 
This  section  is  concerned with  the  volume of  steady-state  inflationary 
finance associated with  a  constant  monetary growth  rate,  Ft  -  (1/M) 
(dM/dt).  In  order to  derive steady-state  properties within  the  simple 
monetary framework for  which  empirical results  are  available, certain 
simplifying assumptions are necessary. Specifically, it is assumed that the 
total volume of real transactions, Y/P,3  and the real rate of discount, r*, 
are independent of  the  (steady)  growth rate of  the money stock,  Ai. Es- 
sentially, all  variations in  time  spent  conducting transactions (reflected 
in changed velocity and changed fraction of  monetized transactions) are 
assumed to come out of leisure. Further, any real-balance-type effects on 
r* are neglected.4 If  the above assumptions are violated, the subsequent 
3 In  the  theoretical  model,  Y/P  corresponds to  income,  rather than  to  total,  trans- 
actions.  The  important  assumption  is  that  total  transactions  remain  fixed.  See  n.  6, 
below. 
4 A  discussion of  the  leisure  assumption  is  contained  in  Bailey  (1956,  p.  102).  The 
general  issue  of  the  effect  of  the  long-term  monetary  growth  rate  on  real  rates  of 
return is  summarized  in  Stein  (1970).  However,  it  should  be  recalled that  r*  corre- WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  983 
analysis does not lose validity. However, if  Y/P  and r* are endogenous, 
additional technical and  behavioral relationships must  be  brought into 
the model. As far as YVP and r* can be satisfactorily treated as exogenous 
(that  is,  independent of  A),  the  need to  examine these additional rela- 
tionships (which have, in any case, not been investigated empirically for 
the  cases  under consideration)  is  removed. 
In  addition to  the  above assumptions, real growth is  abstracted from 
(population and technology fixed),  and use is  made of  the  steady-state 
equality between the monetary growth rate and the inflation rate: pt  rp. 
Given this steady-state condition, the real amount of inflationary finance 
can be written as5 
dM/dt  FM  rp I M (rp)-  (8) 
P  P  P 
Using the expression for  (M/P)  (rp) from equation  (3)  and substituting 
for  (1 -  (D) from equation  (4)  yields  an  explicit  expression for  G  in 
terms of rp: 
G  -  A (YIP)  [1  [  +  k(v\Irp  +  r*  -/r*)] 
* exp [k(  /rp  r*-r*)].  (9) 
The empirical results in table 3 provide estimates from five cases of hyper- 
inflation of A (Y/P)  and k. Since the A (Y/P)  values depend on arbitrary 
index specifications, it  is  of  greater interest  to  consider the  volume of 
government revenue as a fraction of  some measure of  aggregate income. 
An approximate real income index is constructed for each case by  using 
velocity data contained in  Bailey's study  (1956,  p.  99,  table  2, col.  5). 
The details of the construction of  these indices are contained in table  1. 
If  the real income measure is denoted by X,  g -  G/X  is  determined by 
[A(YIP)]  X  in equation (9).6  Estimates of  [A(YIP)]/X,  indicated for 
each case of hyperinflation in table 1, are independent of arbitrary index 
base specifications. 
In  the empirical estimation the real rate of discount, r*, was assumed 
sponds to  the  difference between  two  real rates of  return, rh-  rf,  rather than  to  the 
absolute return, which  would  generally be identified  with  rf 
5 If  the government  issues only  some portion  of  the  total  money  supply,  the  finance 
is  shared  with  other  issuers  of  money.  However,  a  full  analysis  would  also  have  to 
consider the  state  of  competition  in  the  banking  industry. 
6 If X  and Y/P  were equivalent,  [A (Y/P)  ]X  would  be an estimate of A =  V/(a/P)/ 
(Y/P).  The  key  problem  in  using  this  estimate  is  the  distinction  between  income 
transactions  and  total  transactions.  In  the  original  model  the  flow  of  final  (real  in- 
come)  payments,  Y/P,  was  associated  with  two  transaction  flows  (sales  and  factor 
payments).  To  the  extent  that  additional  intermediate  transactions  occur,  A (Y/P) 
refers to  this  larger volume  of  transactions;  hence,  [A(Y/P)]X  is  an  estimate  of  A 
multiplied  by  the  ratio  of  total  transactions  to  (twice)  income  transactions. Cd  -c"  cl 
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to be negligible relative to  the extreme rates of inflation which prevailed. 
Therefore, r* was set equal to zero for each case and was not estimated 
from the data. However, if  one is  concerned with  moderate rates of  in- 
flation, a nonzero value for r* is appropriate. Since direct estimates of r* 
are unavailable, the calculations are based on two values which appear to 
provide a plausible a priori range: r*  112 percent per month and r*  1 
percent per month.7 
A tabulation of g versus rp is  contained in table 2. The  calculation of 
g -  GIX  from equation  (9)  utilizes the overall parameter estimates of 
[A (Y/P)  ]/X  and k from the five cases of hyperinflation (table  1).8 
At  a  6 percent annual rate of  price change  (1,X2  percent per month) 
government revenue is  about  1 percent of  total income. This  magnitude 
should be illustrative for cases of moderate inflation, though some modifi- 
cation is needed to account for the effect of real growth (see n. 9, below). 
At an inflation rate of 5 percent per month (which characterizes the most 
extreme Latin  American experiences), inflationary finance is  between 4 
and 6 percent of  income. Inflationary finance reaches a  peak  of  13-19 
percent of income at an inflation rate in the vicinity of  150 percent per 
month. This peak behavior has particular significance for the stability of 
hyperinflation and is discussed in detail below. 
Since  government revenue is  determined by  the  inflation  rate  from 
equations  (8)  and  (9),  one  may  consider the  monetary growth  rate 
(-  ri,) which maximizes the steady-state volume of inflationary finance. 
Since revenue is given by:  G  r -(MIP)  (rn),  the "optimal" expansion 
rate is  the one which corresponds to  a  money-demand elasticity  of  -1 
(see  Cagan 1956,  pp.  77-86).9  In  the  current model the  inflation-rate 
elasticity of money demand is determined from equation (5).  If the effect 
of  substitute  transactions media  is  neglected  (k -  0),  the  (absolute) 
elasticity never exceeds one-half. Therefore, if  the conventional money is 
7 Friedman  (1969,  pp. 40, 41, 44)  uses a similar concept,  "internal rate of  discount," 
which  he estimates lies in the interval  of  0.05-0.33  per year.  The  values  of  r*  used  in 
this paper are on  the low  end of  the  range proposed by  Friedman. 
8 In  the  earlier statistical  study  the  estimated  k  values  did  not  differ  significantly 
from each other. However, with a,  -  -  1/2 restricted in each case, the estimated k values 
indicated  in  table  3  do  differ significantly.  The  relevant  statistic  is  -2  log  X =  14.3, 
where  X is the  likelihood  ratio.  The  critical  x2  value  for  the  null  hypothesis  of  equal 
k's, X2(4)  or,=  9.5, is exceeded at  the  .05 level.  Tests  of  equality  for the  [A (Y/P)  ]/X 
parameters could not  be performed, since they  depended on  Bailey's  velocity  estimates, 
which have  unknown  reliability. 
9 This  analysis  must  be  modified  in  the  presence of  real  growth.  Friedman  (1971) 
has  shown  that  steady-state  government  revenue  is  given  by:  G  (r,  + p)  (M/P), 
where  p =  rn +  Id, ry,  rn is  the  proportionate  growth  rate  of  population,  ry  is  the 
proportionate  growth  rate  of  real capita  income,  and  it?>  is  the  elasticity  of  real  per 
capita money  demand with  respect to  real per capita  income.  The  revenue-maximizing 
inflation  rate  is  then  determined  from  the  condition  Tlrp  =-1  +  p1(rp +  p).  Hence, 
the absolute elasticity  which  corresponds to  the  maximum  revenue is below  one,  when 
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retained for all payments (and, unrealistically for very high rates of  in- 
flation, if  the  volume of  payments remains constant),  no  bound would 
exist on the volume of inflationary finance. However, with  the introduc- 
tion of  the money-substitute effect, the inflation-rate elasticity  increases 
(absolutely) beyond one-half as the inflation rate rises. The inflation rate 
at  which the  elasticity  reaches -1  can  be  determined explicitly  as  an 
inverse function of  the money-substitute parameter k. The  solution to  a 
quadratic equation based on equation (5)  yields an approximate relation 
for the revenue-maximizing  rate: 
A* 
(r*  <  A*)  .  ( 
~~~~10) 
Therefore, a small value of k  (high average cost for employing substitute 
transactions media)  corresponds to  a  high  revenue-maximizing rate  of 
monetary expansion. 
The  amount of  revenue relative to  total  real income at  the  rate It* 
can be explicitly calculated from equation (9)  as 
0.84  A(YIP) 
k  X  (1) 
Values of  [t* and g*  are indicated in  table  1 for the  five  individual 
cases of hyperinflation and for the parameters corresponding  to the over- 
all sample. The values of k and [A (Y/P)  ]  /X  are the empirical estimates 
indicated in table 1. The estimated values of R* range from about 80 per- 
cent per month for Austria to about 150 percent per month for Germany.10 
10In  Cagan's study  (1956,  p.  81,  table  9,  col.  1)  the  estimated  revenue-maximizing 
rates are much  lower  than  those  derived  in  the  current  analysis.  His  range  is  about 
11 percent per month  for Austria and Hungary  I  to  44 percent per month  for  Poland. 
Cagan  notes  (p.  81)  that  "the  actual  rates  were  well  above  the  constant  rates  that 
would  have  maximized  the  ultimate  revenue."  For  the  A*  values  calculated  in  this 
paper  (table  1),  this  conclusion  holds  for  only  two  of  the  five  cases  considered.  A 
likely explanation for the  divergence between  Cagan's results and mine is that  Cagan's 
demand-for-money  function,  M/P  =  e--(arP+,y),  has  the  inflation-rate  elasticity, 
lrP  =-rp,  in  which  the  elasticity  increases  (absolutely)  directly  with  rp.  In  the 
model  used  in  this  paper  (eq.  [5])  the  elasticity  increases  with  rp  at  a  slower  rate. 
Therefore,  the  rate  at  which  the  elasticity  equals  -1  is  reached  at  a  lower  inflation 
rate  with  Cagan's  function.  (This  conclusion  actually  depends  on  the  fact  that  the 
parameters are estimated  from  a sample where  the  average  value  of  r19  is much  below 
the  revenue-maximizing  rate.)  Bailey's  numerical  results  art  based  on  the  money- 
demand  functions  which  Cagan  estimated.  The  relative  empirical  merits  of  Cagan's 
money-demand  function  and  the  function  used  in  the  current  paper  are  discussed  in 
Barro  (1970b,  pp.  1257-58)  for  the  four  post-World  War  I  cases.  The  results  in 
Cagan's form for the second Hungarian  case are contained in table 4. In  a  recent study 
Friedman  (1971)  estimates  revenue-maximizing  rates  of  inflation  which  are  below  20 
percent per year. Hence, his estimates are far below  those given by  Cagan, which  were, 
in turn, below  those presented here. The explanation  for Friedman's result is threefold: 
First,  he  uses  Cagan's  form  of  money-demand  function,  which,  as  indicated  above, 
tends  to  produce  lower  estimates  of  the  revenue-maximizing  rate.  Second,  he  uses WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  989 
The  estimates of  maximum revenue range from- 5-7  percent of  national 
income for Poland to  15-22  percent for Hungary I.  Corresponding  to  the 
overall estimate of k, the overall estimate of A* is about 140 percent per 
month, which corresponds  to  12-17  percent of national income." 
Table  1 also contains values of  ?tlmax,  the actual maximum of  monthly 
average monetary growth rate which occurred during each hyperinflation, 
and jtmaxC,  the extreme value of  the  effective rate of  inflation which oc- 
curred. Since steady-state measures are involved, it may be useful to com- 
pare  the  estimated  value  of  A* with  jTmaxe,  as  well  as  with  [Imax,  in 
order to determine whether the optimum expansion rate was exceeded (for 
a significant time period) in each case. One may conclude from table 1 that 
the revenue-maximizing  rate was exceeded for Germany and Hungary II 
but not for Austria, Hungary I, and Poland. 
The Stability of Hyperinflation 
The view of  monetary expansion as a vehicle for generating government 
revenue may be used to analyze one aspect of the stability of hyperinfla- 
tion. If an economy is initially in a noninflationary situation, government 
revenue may be generated by instituting a positive value of At.  Additional 
expenditures  may be financed by further increases in At,  and each increase 
is successful (that is, actually results in a higher steady-state revenue) as 
long as [i <  At*.  However, if a total steady-state revenue in excess of G* 
g* * X  is  desired, inflationary finance cannot suffice. When [t is  pressed 
beyond At*,  revenue declines (at least, eventually) rather than rises. If the 
government is oblivious to the basic problem, the reaction to this reduced 
revenue may be an additional increase in At,  which produces further reduc- 
tions in revenue and creates added pressure for even higher rates of  ex- 
pansion. Eventually, a nearly complete flight from money would result, and 
the "benefit"  of inflationary  finance would vanish. At this point (or possibly 
sooner if the government is astute),  considerable pressure can be expected 
for basic monetary reform (which often  involves renaming the  currency 
unit but, in its essence, involves curtailing the growth rate of  the money 
stock). 
From an empirical standpoint, the five cases of  hyperinflation tend to 
substantiate this  sort  of  process. The  most  interesting evidence derives 
estimates  of  the  a-coefficient  in  Cagan's  form  (see  above)  which  are  ten  to  twenty 
times  as  large  as  those  estimated  by  Cagan,  thus  reducing  the  estimated  revenue- 
maximizing  inflation  rate by  a  factor  of  ten  to  twenty.  Third,  he  includes  a  nonzero 
value  for real growth  (p in  n. 9, above)  which  also tends  to  lower  the  estimated  rate. 
Friedman stresses this inclusion of  real growth  as the explanation  for his low  estimates. 
However,  if  real  growth  had  been  included  in  the  money-demand  function  of  the 
current study,  the impact on the estimates  of  At* in table  1 would  have  been  negligible. 
11 Since these  values  are  calculated  from  eqq.  (10)  and  (11),  they  are  approxima- 
tions  which  neglect  r*  relative  to  A*. For  example,  with  r* -  1  percent  per  month, 
the maximum  g* value  in table  2 is  19 percent  rather than  17 percent. 990  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
from the  German case, in  which the  inflationary course appeared quite 
stable for a number of years, despite values of [i and nle  in excess of  60 
percent per month (Barro 1970b, table 2). After reaching [=  0.66/month 
(7c  0.63) in February 1923, the inflation receded for several months and 
reached it -  0.20/month  (n6  -  0.20)  in May  1923. The February rate of 
expansion was not attained again until July (at  0.88,  te  -0.71  in July). 
When the critical monetary expansion rate, At*  1.5 [1.4, 1.7] per month, 
was exceeded in  August-September 1923  (at -  1.5,  e  -  2.7  in  August; 
-  3.4,  it"  3.1  in  September),  the  inflation went  completely out  of 
control. The explosive process was not contained until the sweeping mone- 
tary reform of November 1923. 
A similar analysis is applicable to the last months of  the second Hun- 
garian  hyperinflation. The  critical  monetary  expansion  rate,  1*  1.2 
[0.9,  1.6]  per month, was first approached in November 1945  (,u  1.2, 
it=  1.0 in November). The process did not explode at  this point, since 
[t dropped below 0.8 per month in December 1945 and January 1946  (Se 
0.92 and 0.75, respectively). However, the critical expansion rate was 
definitely exceeded in February-March 1946  t  =  1.3, Jte  1.7 in Febru- 
ary; [t -  1.9, 7e  -  1.4 in March. The inflation went entirely out of control 
between April and July  1946, with the maximum rates of inflation dwarf- 
ing those of the German experience.  The process was finally terminated in 
a monetary reform  at the end of July 1946. 
The  Austrian and the first Hungarian cases both involve the  confine- 
ment of actual rates of monetary expansion below the critical rate, with 
no  obvious appearances of  instability.  For  Austria, the  peak  monetary 
expansion was  0.54/month  in  August-September  1922  (Ste  0.47  and 
0.31, respectively), which was well below  *=  0.8  [0.6,  1.2]  per month. 
After September, [t  and  Se  declined gradually, reaching [=  0.18,  Sne 
0.10 in  December. In  1923, [t varied between 0.12  and zero per month, 
while ite varied between 0.08  and 0.04  per month. For Hungary I,  the 
peak expansion occurred in August 1923 with [=  0.57 per month  (Jte  - 
0.38),  which was below At* -  0.9 [0.5, 2.6] per month. Subsequently, there 
was a gradual decline in At,  although the rate of expansion remained above 
0.10 per month until November 1924. 
For Poland, the  evidence is  less  clear. The  peak  expansion occurred 
during the  four-month period of  October 1923 to  January 1924, during 
which [i was between 0.62 and 0.87 per month, and ne  was between 0.74 
and 0.93 per month. These rates of  expansion were close to,  but below, 
the critical rate: At*= 1.4 [1.1,  1.8] per month. The behavior subsequent 
to the peak expansion involved a rapid reduction in [i and Get  reaching [- 
0.04  per month and  e: -  0.13  per month in  April  1924. Although the 
Polish experience  did not exhibit the obvious instability which marked the 
German and second Hungarian cases, an extensive monetary reform did 
occur in Poland in April 1924. WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  99I 
III.  The  Welfare  Cost  of  Inflation 
This section considers the net welfare cost, or excess burden, imposed on 
an economy by a steady, anticipated rate of inflation.12 
The revenue obtained by government, [t(MIP),  is directly balanced by 
an inflationary cost  to  individuals, r"(M/P).13  The  net  welfare cost  of 
inflation  (abstracting from any  direct costs  of  printing money)  derives 
from the transaction costs which individuals incur in order to avoid the 
private interest costs associated with holding money. In the current model 
increases in inflation induce increases in transaction costs in two respects: 
first, individuals raise the  frequency of  transactions  (increase velocity) 
for  monetized transactions, and,  second, individuals employ  alternative 
payments media with higher transaction costs for a greater proportion of 
their  transactions. At  moderate rates  of  inflation,  the  substitution  of 
alternative payments media for money is  empirically unimportant. It  is 
shown in  table  2  that  F, the  fraction of  transactions conducted via  a 
substitute media, remains below 1 percent until r, reaches a value between 
2 and 5 percent per month  that is,  until  the  rate of  inflation becomes 
substantially larger than r*.  Hence,  for inflation rates with  magnitudes 
equal to or below the order of r*, changes in transaction costs produced by 
changes in rp reflect mostly alterations in the frequency of monetized trans- 
actions. In this range of rp the total transaction costs can be approximated 
by (alP)  (n/T),  which is the cost of conducting monetized transactions at 
frequency n1T in equation (1).  Moreover, when the payments period is 
selected according to  the optimal policy indicated in equation  (2),  indi- 
viduals act so as to equate the  (total)  amount of transaction costs to the 
(total)  amount of interest costs.14 That is, 
W  (alP)(n1T)  -  (rp +  r*)(M/P) 
A(Y/P)  \rpr*  (when rp .  r*),  (12) 
12 This  analysis  follows  Bailey  (1956,  pp.  93,  94)  in  abstracting  from  costs  which 
involve  the  uncertainty  of  the  inflationary  course.  In  particular,  distribution  effects 
are  ignored.  It  is  further  assumed  that  open,  rather  than  suppressed,  inflation  is 
occurring. 
13 Since the  total  interest  cost  in  eq.  (1)  is  (r.  +  r*) (M/P),  the  r*(M/P)  portion 
is not  offset by  the  flow  of  government  revenue. However,  an increase in  M/P  can be 
viewed  as an increase in  private  real wealth  which  is evaluated  in  flow  terms by  indi- 
viduals as r*(M/P).  Hence, the increase in real wealth  offsets the real interest-foregone 
cost,  r*(M/P),  in  eq.  (1).  However,  to  the  extent  that  a  change  in  M/P  reflects  a 
change in  the  average  holding  of  goods  inventories,  the  change  in  real  interest  fore- 
gone  on  these  goods  holdings  would  be  an  element  of  both  private  and  social  cost. 
This  aspect  was  not  treated  in  my  earlier model,  since  a  uniform  pattern  of  expendi- 
tures  was  assumed  (Barro  1970b, p.  1237),  but  has  been  considered  in  some  recent 
theoretical  work  (Clower  1969;  Feige  and  Parkin  1971;  Santomero  1971).  See  also 
n.  16, below. 
14 The  condition  for the  optimal  T/n  is  that  the  marginal  reduction  in  transaction 
costs  just  balance  the  marginal  increment  in  interest  costs.  However,  the  value  of 
T/n  chosen  in  this  manner  (eq.  [2])  is  also  such  as  to  equate  the  total  amount  of 
transaction costs to  the total  amount  of  interest  costs in  eq.  (1). 992  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where W is the  welfare  cost,  which  corresponds  to  the  resources  used  up  in 
undertaking monetized transactions at frequency n/T. 
The minimum  welfare cost in equation (12)  is zero, which is attained at 
rp  r*.  That  is,  the  welfare cost  disappears when money bears real 
interest at rate r*. At this point, the private cost which individuals attach 
to  holding money, which depends on  the  rate  rp +  r*,  is  zero-hence, 
individuals are not motivated to engage in costly  transactions in order to 
economize on private interest costs. Since, in fact, there is no social cost 
attached to holding money (that is, the interest cost is a private, but not 
a social, cost),  while there is a social cost attached to making transactions, 
the condition rp=  -r*  leads to  the  social optimum where welfare cost 
disappears.15  This conclusion corresponds  to the usual result in the litera- 
ture on  the  optimum quantity  of  money-see,  for  example, Friedman 
(1969, pp. 33-34). 
Since (F  0  when  rp ,  r*,  government revenue is  determined from 
equation (3)  as 
G  rp(M/P)  A_(YP)rp_  (when  rp  ,  r*). 
V\rp +  r* 
Hence,  the  marginal  collection  cost  (MCC)  of  inflationary  finance  is, 
using equation (12), 
rp  ?  r*  (3  MCC  dW/dG  +  (whenrp  ~r*).  (13) 
r.  +  2r* 
The MCC is zero at r=  -r*  rises to one-half at rp  0, and rises above 
one-half as rp becomes positive. The important result is that the marginal 
collection cost of inflationary finance exceeds one-half for all positive rates 
of inflation. 
For  very  high  rates of  inflation  (rp >  2-5  percent per  month),  the 
substitution of alternative payments media becomes important, and equa- 
tion  (13),  which  omits  this  substitution  possibility,  will  significantly 
understate the marginal collection cost of inflationary finance. The welfare 
cost must now include the  transaction costs  associated with  the  use  of 
(socially)  less efficient payments media, along with the cost of conducting 
monetized transactions, which has already been considered.'6 Both  com- 
15 In  effect,  since  transactions  are  costly  and  serve  no  social  function,  transactions 
do  not  occur at the social  optimum.  Frankly,  I  find  this  result disturbing,  although  it 
does seem to  agree with  the  conventional  optimum-quantity-of-money  result.  Perhaps 
some  new  conclusions would  emerge  from  a  model  where  transactions  served  a social 
function  in  the sense of  providing  information  and/or  economizing  on  search activity. 
16The  welfare  cost  must  also  include  the  real interest  cost  attached  to  the  average 
holding  of  the  alternative  payments  media.  That  is,  the  real  interest  foregone  on 
holdings  of  such  alternative  payments  media  as physical  commodities  and  foreign  ex- 
change constitutes  a net social  cost. However,  this  element  is implicitly  included  along 
with  the  transaction  costs in  eq.  (14),  below. WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  993 
ponents of  welfare cost are implicitly determined by  the  money-demand 
function of equations (3)  and  (4),  which has the inflation rate elasticity 
as shown in equation (5).  Since the private interest cost of holding money 
is  (r. +  r*) (MIP),  the  imputed value of  a  marginal increment in  real 
balances, d(MIP),  is  (rp +  r*).  In the current model this imputed value 
corresponds to  the  reduction in transaction costs of  the  two types men- 
tioned above. Hence, the total transaction costs incurred at inflation rate 
17 is given by  the integral which measures the  area under the  money- 
demand curve:18 
M 
--  (0) 
P 
W  at  (rp +  r*)  d(M/P).  (14) 
Al 
-  (rp  +  r*) 
P 
The integration can be carried out, using the money-demand function of 
equations (3)  and (4),  to yield a closed-form expression for W. The result- 
ing expression  is cumbersome  and is not written out here. Since the integra- 
tion under the money-demand curve in equation (14)  implicitly includes 
the added transaction costs for movement into substitute payments media, 
the calculated value of W exceeds that indicated in equation (12).  How- 
ever, the departure from that equation is significant only when rp is sub- 
stantially larger than r*.  The  expression for  welfare cost  derived from 
equation (14)  also retains the property that W ->  0 as r. -->  r*. 
Values of W from equation ( 14), relative to real income X, are tabulated 
in table 2 for various values of rp and for the two values of r*, %2  percent 
and 1 percent per month. The numerical results are based on the overall 
estimate of  k and on  the  two overall estimates of  [A (Y/P)]/X,  which 
correspond to  the two values of  r*, from table  1. The  calculations also 
assume no variation in r* as rp changes. 
The  estimated welfare cost is  between 1 and 3  percent of  income at 
r  -  0.  Accordingly, these  figures estimate  the  steady-state  gain  which 
would be obtained by moving from a zero rate of inflation to the optimum 
quantity of  money where r  -  r*. It  is  interesting to  compare these 
estimates with those obtained earlier by  Friedman (1969,  p.  44)  for the 
United States. For an internal rate of discount (comparable with r*)  of 
0.05 per year, Friedman estimates a potential welfare gain from moving to 
17 The  symbol  7p  is  used  to  distinguish  the  current  rate  of  inflation  from  the  run- 
ning variable  rp  which  appears inside  the  integral. 
18 The  approach  of  measuring  social  cost  by  integrating  under  the  money-demand 
curve is discussed in Friedman  (1953)  and in  Bailey  (1956,  pp.  102-3).  This  approach 
could also have  been used when  substitute  transactions media were  neglected to  obtain 
equation  (12).  This  earlier expression would  emerge  from  the  integration  in  eq.  (14) 
if  k =  0 were set in  eq.  (4). 994  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
the optimum quantity of money of 0.4-0.7  percent of income, while for a 
rate of 0.33 per year he estimates a gain of  11.2-18.5  percent of income. 
Estimates of the welfare gain from my model are 1.2 percent and 7.8 per- 
cent  of  income for r* -  .05  per year  and  .33  per year,  respectively.'9 
Hence, mv results and Friedman's are of comparable  magnitude, but mine 
are less sensitive to variations in r*. 
For rates of  inflation between 2  and 5 percent per month, which are 
typical  rates for some Latin  American countries, the  estimated welfare 
cost is between 3 and 7 percent of income. When the rate of inflation rises 
above  5 percent per month, the welfare cost  advances rapidly. For  the 
25-50  percent per month range of  inflation rates, which typifies hyper- 
inflations, the  estimated welfare cost  is  between  11  and  22  percent of 
income. Finally, when the inflation rate rises as high as  100-150  percent 
per month, which is  the  range in  which hyperinflations have  tended to 
become unstable  (see  Section II,  above),  the  estimated welfare cost  is 
between 22 and 38 percent of income. 
The marginal effect of inflation on welfare cost can be determined from 
differentiation  of the integral in equation (14)  as20 
dW  /rp  +  r*\ 
d  flrp(M  P)  H 
Since government revenue is given by G  rp(M/P),  the marginal collec- 
tion cost is 
fTlrp  (rp 
MCC  -  dW/dG- = 
+p 
(15) 
Friedman's estimate  corresponding  to  the  discount  rate  of  0.33  per year  also  in- 
volves  his  assumption  that  the  discount  rate  would  fall  to  0.17  per  year  when  the 
optimum  quantity  of  money  was  attained.  In  fact,  the  calculation  of  welfare  gain 
should not be affected by  changes in r* as rp is reduced from 0 to -r*.  The  expression 
for welfare  gain  from  moving  from  a zero  inflation  rate  to  the  optimum  quantity  of 
money  is 
M 
-(0) 
P 
W(r,  -O)  f  (rp  +r*)  d(MIP) 
M 
-  (r*) 
P 
0 
orf)[f*  (MIP)  d(rp +  r*), 
r*(rp)  0) 
where Ylrp,+*  is the  elasticity  of  M/P  with  respect to  rp +  r*.  Variations  in  r*  as  r. 
varies do  not  change  the  value  of  the  integral.  Viewed  in  the  context  of  my  model, 
the welfare gain corresponds to  the transaction  costs at rp,  0, which  is A(Y/P)  /r*, 
which  depends  only  on  r*(rp  0  0)  and  not  on  r*(rp =-r*). 
20 The  differentiation is actually  with  respect to 7P, which  appears in  the  lower  limit 
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where the inflation rate elasticity is given as a  function or rp  and r*  in 
equation (5).  For moderate values of rp(rp  -  r*),  the expression given in 
equation (13)  is a satisfactory approximation  to equation (15).  For values 
of rp much above r*, the MCC as shown in equation (13)  understates the 
cost shown in equation (15),  since the latter expression includes the cost 
of movements into substitute transactions media. 
Values of MCC are tabulated for various values of  rp in table 2. The 
most important conclusion, which stems from the general property of  the 
model which is most apparent in equation (13),  is that the marginal col- 
lection cost exceeds 50 percent for all positive values of rp.21 Hence, gen- 
erating revenue by producing inflation can be socially desirable only if the 
marginal cost of  alternative revenue-raising schemes exceeds 50 percent. 
Empirically, Bailey (1956, p.  108) suggests that 7 percent is a reasonable 
approximation for tax collection costs  (including misallocation costs)  in 
countries with poor administrative systems. However, since Bailey is  ap- 
parently referring to  average, rather than  to  marginal, collection costs, 
the appropriate  figure may be substantially higher, such as 15-20 percent. 
Nevertheless, if  the  50  percent MCC  figure for  inflationary finance is 
accepted as reasonably accurate, one cannot make a plausible case for in- 
flationary finance on social welfare grounds. Superficially, raising revenue 
by printing money has appeal, particularly to underdeveloped  countries, be- 
cause of the low direct administrative cost. However, the indirect cost is 
sufficiently great that a poorly administered income or sales tax should be 
preferable from the standpoint of social welfare. 
IV.  Additional  Emnpirical  Results 
Table 3 contains empirical estimates of  the parameters, (ca,, k,  b),  from 
the model of  equations (6)  and  (7)  for the five cases of  hyperinflation. 
These  estimates  are  subject  to  the  constraint,  (x,  1/2. The  point  esti- 
mates for Austria, Germany, Hungary I,  and Poland are basically similar 
to those reported  in the earlier paper (Barro 1970b, p. 1255), in which &c2 
was unconstrained. Unconstrained estimates for Hungary II,  reported in 
table 4, are also similar to the estimates with &.,  %. However, with 
Ca2  fixed, the  (conditional)  confidence intervals  for  Z are  considerably 
narrower than before. Because a., -  -  was suggested by  the underly- 
ing theory, and because this conjecture was borne out  by  the  empirical 
results from the unconstrained regressions (see table 4 and Barro 1970b, 
p. 1256), it is thought that more efficient estimates of k (and of a,  and b) 
are obtained by  constraining &,  -  1X'.  Therefore, the  estimates of  k 
from table 3 were used in the analysis of Sections II  and III,  above. 
21 This conclusion is strengthened with  the presence of  real growth  (see n. 9, above). 
In  this  case, when  rp  r*,  the  MCC  is  (rP +  r*)/(r_  +  2r* -  p),  which  exceeds  the 
value  shown  in equation  (13)  when  p >  0. I  9  I-  9  00  oo  ?  C' 
'-4  0 
0~~~~~~~~~t 
00  o  o  00  00 
?  O  O  O  O  ?  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cd  E - 
a'  (N 
0in  ON  in 
O  S  ~~~C  O  C'  ?  <msC 
Ps  >  ?  |  l  l  |  9'-4  '4  00 
bO  )  0  t  31  v  O  lr)  O  sa.  O C 
e  9  9_  9  9  9l  N  c  ; 
.0 
z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
H  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c 
.4*  O  (N  oo*  \.  0  00  l 
0-  0  0-  a  00  4o 
.-  .0  a  B800  . 
olC  1 
00 
oo  C 
0,  0--C 
;  .  =  bs  a  X  X  i  8  Qlii~~~~=  & 
996  0  6  4 
U  ~  ~ ~ ~ ~  Z  0  -)  (o  0--  0,o  0 X  - X-  C 
~~~~~~.  Z  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
004)  104 
C)  II  C7  _4  I 
6H  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~  M  4 
00.  (N  '  0  0,  .0.  c 
0  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~~~~~~~~~.. 
(N  0-)  't  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  , 
0C 
I  I  I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~V 
bD  ~  ~  00  (N>0 
0  C~~~~~~0~  '- 
*  .  ~~~  ~~~0  C4  0> 
0  . 
00  00  M 
~~~~  0  ~~~~~~~~ 
996~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 00  C 
0 
00 
0~~~~~0 
00 
H  00 
<C0  C5  ci  0 
0  0~~~~~~~~ 
00  0  z 
997 998  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Table  2  (col.  6),  above,  contains  values  of  (MP)(rp)  /(MIP)(0)  for 
various values of rp, corresponding  to the overall estimate of k from table 
3. The decline in MIP  with increasing rp is  to  21-29  percent of  (MIP) 
(0)  at rp  =  10 percent per month, to  8-11  percent of  (MIP)(0)  at  50 
percent per month, and to less than 1 percent of (MIP)  (0)  at 500 percent 
per month. The  decline in MIP  corresponds partly to  a  rise in  velocity 
[(1  -  '2)(Y  P) /(MIP)],  as indicated in column 7 of table 2, and partly 
to a fall in the fraction of monetized transactions (1 -  (d). The effect of 
rp on 'F (col. 8)  is small until extreme rates of inflation are attained. For 
example, only 4-5  percent of transactions have been "demonetized" at rp 
-  10 percent per month-a  rate of inflation which is extremely high by 
conventional standards. Apparently, the convenience of money for making 
transactions  is  sufficiently  great  (k  sufficiently  low)  that  individuals  are 
unwilling to abandon money as a means of payments for most transactions 
even at rates of inflation above a 100 percent annual rate. However, indi- 
viduals do respond to an inflation rate of this magnitude by greatly speed- 
ing up the payments process-with  velocity at rp  -  10 percent per month 
three to  five times as  great as  that  at  rp  -  0.  At  rp  -  50  percent per 
month, (d is about 20 percent, and at rp  -  500 percent per month, 4? is 
about 80 percent. Thus, at truly astronomical rates, individuals are willing 
to substitute alternative transactions media, but the substitution process is 
not complete even at the incredible inflation rate of 500 percent per month. 
With the inclusion of results for the second Hungarian hyperinflation, it 
is possible to make an interesting comparison of this experience with that 
which occurred twenty years earlier in the same country. On the basis of 
his  empirical results  (using  Cagan's estimates),  Bailey  (1956,  p.  108) 
conducts a  "comparison of  Hungary after  the  second World War with 
Hungary after  the  first" and concludes:  "the share of  national income 
that  the  government  could  get  at  a given  welfare  cost  . .  . was  far  smaller 
in the second hyperinflation than in the first. One possible explanation for 
this is that a second hyperinflation within a single generation found people 
far better prepared to reduce their real cash balances than they had been 
when they had no such previous experience." 
In terms of the underlying model used in this paper, the long-term effect 
suggested by Bailey can be interpreted as shifts in the k, b, or [A (YIP) I/ 
X  parameters. For example, if  people became more adept at  developing 
and  using  convenient  alternative  means  of  payments,  this  change  would 
reduce the average cost of employing a substitute transactions medium and 
would therefore raise the  k  parameter (see  Barro  1970b, p.  1242, and 
Section I,  above).  However, the  estimated k-values for Hungary I  and 
Hungary II, contained in table 3, do not differ significantly. Another inter- 
pretation is  that  long-run experience induces individuals to  adjust  more 
quickly  to  changing  rates  of  inflation-hence,  b  in  equation  (7)  would 
increase in  the  long  run.  From  the  underlying model  (Barro  1970b, WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  999 
pp. 1245, 1250), a shift in b could reflect a decrease in the cost of institut- 
ing changes in a given pattern of  transactions behavior-for  example, a 
reduction in the cost of changing the payments period. However, the em- 
pirical results in table 3 do not support the conjecture that b for Hungary 
II  exceeds that  for Hungary I.  Another possibility  for  reducing money 
demand in the long run is a cut in the  [A (YIP)]  X  parameter, which is 
included in  table  1. For a  given  (YVP)IX,  a  fall in  A  would reflect a 
decrease in transaction costs associated with the use of  the conventional 
money (for example, a decrease in  the cost  of  making wage payments). 
The estimated [A (YVP)]  X parameters  have unknown reliability, but the 
values for Hungary I and Hungary II in table 1 appear to be similar. 
Given the similarity in  the k  and  [A (Y/P)IX]  parameters, the  esti- 
mated values of  A* and g*  for the two cases in  table  1 are very close. 
Therefore, the results suggest that no significant structural shifts occurred 
from the first to the second Hungarian experience.  While it  is theoreti- 
cally  possible that  previous experience with  hyperinflation will  produce 
shifts in k, b, or  [A(Y/P)/X]  and therefore produce shifts in  vt* and 
g*-this  possibility is  not  borne out  by  the  empirical evidence on  the 
Hungarian experiences. 
Test  for  Absence  of Money  Illusion 
Since the underlying theory is  a  theory of  real demand for money, all 
empirical estimation has been carried out,  thus far, with log  (MIP)  as 
the dependent variable. The theoretical absence of  money illusion in  the 
demand function can  be  tested  by  using  -log  (P)  as  the  dependent 
variable (since P is regarded as endogenous, with M  exogenous) and in- 
cluding -log  M  as an independent variable with an unrestricted coeffi- 
cient: 
-log  P  c  ?  +a2  log  109(e  + r*)  +  log (1 -  ) 
+?a3- 
(-logM). 
(16) 
Absence of money illusion corresponds  to 
ca:3  1 in equation (16). 
Point  estimates of  a3 and  likelihood ratio statistics  for  the  null  hy- 
pothesis, a3  t  1, are contained in table 5 for the five cases of hyperinfla- 
tion. The results strongly verify the absence of money illusion for Austria 
and Germany,  with the point estimates of a:3, 0.995 and 1.023, respectively, 
extremely close to  1.0. The  null hypothesis, a,  1, is  also accepted for 
22 The  two  Hungarian  cases are  even  similar  in  respect  to  average  regression error 
-approximately  9 percent  for  the  first case and  10 percent  for  the  second  (table  3). 
These values  contrast  with  the  range of  4-5  percent  error obtained  in  the  other  three 
cases. This  result may  suggest  that:  (a)  Hungarians  are  inherently  unpredictable,  or 
(b)  Hungarians  always  generate  poor  data.  No  doubt  other  explanations  can  be 
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TABLE  5 
TEST  FOR  ABSENCE  OF  MONEY  ILLUSION 
[-log  P = aI +  a2 log (;te)  +  log ( 1 -.)  +  a3  (-log  M) ] 
-2  log k (a3 =  1); 
Case  A  Critical Value =  X2(l)  =  3.8 
Austria .0.995  0.0 
Germany .1.023  0.6 
Hungary  I  .0.110  46.1 
Hungary II .0.744  11.7 
Poland .0.854  1.6 
NOTE.-2  log X =  T log  (SSE*/SSE),  where X is  the likelihood ratio. SSE is  the  minimum sum of 
squared errors with  a3  unrestricted. SSE* is the  minimum subject to  d^ -  1, and T  is  the number of 
observations.  Asymptotically,  -  2 log X is distributed as x2 (1)  in this case. 
Poland. The  null hypothesis is  rejected for both  Hungarian cases. This 
rejection in the Hungarian cases is, in a  sense, consistent with the large 
average errors that characterize the regression fits for these cases  (table 
3)  .23  It is not possible to account for these problems at this point, though 
one possible source of difficulty is the assumed exogeneity of M in equation 
(16).  In any case, the satisfactory results on absence of money illusion for 
Austria, Germany, and Poland provide support for the underlying model. 
23  The  first Hungarian  case also exhibits strong  serial correlation  of  residuals  (table 
3),  while  the  Polish  and  German  cases  exhibit  smaller  amounts  of  significant  re- 
sidual  autocorrelation.  The  inclusion  of  some  additional  explanatory  variables  in 
the  regression  equations-a  real-income  proxy,  a  time-trend  variable,  and  seasonal 
factors-did  not  remove  the  serial correlation in these  cases  (Barro  1970a, pp.  58-61). 
The  four  post-World  War  I  cases  have  also  been  reestimated  under  the  assumption 
that  the  error term was  generated  by  a  first-order  Markov  process:  ut =  kut_1  +  vt 
(Barro  1970a, pp.  62-66).  Simultaneous  estimation  of  k  with  the  (ac,  a2,  k,  b)  para- 
meters showed  that  the  previous  estimates  for  Austria  and  Germany  were  insensitive 
to  this  shift  in  the  assumed  error process.  The  results  for  Poland  were  mixed,  since 
the  parameter estimates  were  not  substantially  altered  by  the  inclusion  of  the  k-co- 
efficient,  but  the  first-order  Markov  process  did  not  fully  account  for  the  residual 
autocorrelation in  this  case. The  results for the  first Hungarian  case were  entirely  un- 
satisfactory,  since  the  estimate  of  k  did  not  converge  below  1.0.  This  difficulty  is 
consistent  with  the  other  problems  that  have  been  encountered  in  this  case  and 
suggests  some  type  of  specification  error-that  is,  some  error in  the  theoretical  form 
or  (more  likely,  considering  the  success in  the  other  post-World  War  I  cases)  some 
data problems leading to  serious errors in  the  measurement  of  variables. WELFARE  COST  OF  INFLATION  1001 
Appendix 
SAMPLE-PERIOD  VALUES  FOR  HUNGARY  II,  BASED  ON  RESULTS  REPORTED 
IN  TABLE  4  (02  UNCONSTRAINED) 
Log(M/P)  t 
End-Of-  Log(M/P)f  (Esti- 
Month  Pt  7t  at e  (Actual)  mated)  Residual 
1945: 
June  ..........  0.066  0.001  0.042  1.061  1.069  -0.008 
July  ..........  0.071  0.311  0.053  0.871  0.935  -0.064 
August  ........  0.088  0.481  0.074  0.793  0.741  0.052 
September  ....  .  0.117  0.795  0.118  0.564  0.451  0.112 
October  .......  0.232  1.867  0.338  -0.339  -0.247  -0.092 
November  .....  0.484  1.870  0.925  -0.964  -1.052  0.088 
December  .....  0.636  u.898  0.908  -1.108  -1.035  -0.072 
1946: 
January  .......  0.597  0.656  0.752  -0.995  -0.871  -0.124 
February  ......  0.705  2.080  1.619  -1.717  -1.602  -0.115 
March  ........  0.841  1.414  1.446  -1.261  -1.483  0.222 
NOTE.-Units  for  a,  7r0,  and  7re  are  per  month  (see  eq.  [6]).  M  is  an  end-of-month  measure 
of  bank  notes  issued  by  the  National  Bank  of  Hungary  in  units  of  109  Pengos  (U.N.,  Monthly  Bull- 
Statis.  [January  1947,  June  1947]).  P  is  an  end-of-month  index  of  the  cost  of  living  in  Budapest, 
based  on  1929  -  0.1.  From  June  1944  to  July  1946  the  data  is  from  U.N.,  Monthly  Bull.  Statis. 
(June  1947),  and  supply.  (June  1948),  p.  143.  From  December  1940  to  March  1944,  price  data  have 
been  obtained  from  the  following  sources:  Ann.  Statis.  Hongrois  (1940),  p.  113:  ibid.  (1941),  p.  150; 
Magyar  Statis.  Szemle  (1943),  pp.  232-33:  ibid.  (1944),  pp.  376-77;  Internat.  Labor  Rev.  (1944); 
and  Wirtschaft  and  Statistik  (1944).  Unfortunately,  it  has  not  yet  been  possible  to  locate  monthly 
data  for  the  period  April  1944-March  1945,  and  interpolation  was  necessary  to  generate  7r0  for  this 
period. If  this data were located, it  would be  possible to  increase the  number of  sample observations 
for  Hungary  II.  The starting value for 7re  in  January  1942  is  taken  to  be  0.016,  the  average rate of 
price  change  between  December  1940  and  December  1941. 
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